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POWER AND TACTICS IN BARGAINING 
SAMUEL B. BACHARACH and EDWARD J. LAWLER* 
This paper develops and tests an analytical framework for analyzing the 
selection of tactics in bargaining. Using a variant of power-dependence 
theory, the authors propose that bargainers will use different dimensions of 
dependence, such as the availability of alternative outcomes from other 
sources and the value of the outcomes at stake, to select among different tac-
tics. Tc test this model, the authors conducted two simulation experiments 
that portrayed an employee-employer conflict overa pay raise, manipulating 
four dimensions of dependence: employee's outcome alternatives, employee's 
outcome value, employer's outcome alternatives, and employer's outcome 
value. Within thiscontext, respondents estimated the likelihood of each actor 
(employee, employer) adopting four tactics: self-enhancement, coalition, 
threat to leave, and conflict avoidance. The results of one experiment show 
that an actor's own dependence, rather than his opponent's dependence on 
him, is the primary basis for his evaluation and selection of tactics, and also 
that decisions regarding different tactics are determined by different dimen-
sions of dependence. The results of the other experiment indicate that the op-
ponent's initial lactic affects the links between dimensions of dependence and 
an actor's tactics, and the dimensions of dependence affect the propensity 
toward "tactic matching." 
BARGAINING behavior is typically pre-ceded by an evaluation of the available 
tactics and of the power relationship be-
tween the bargainers. Indeed, it would be 
•Samuel B. Bacharach is an associate professor of in-
dustrial and labor relations at the New York State 
School of Industrial and labor Relations at Cornell 
University and Edward J. Lawler is an associate 
professor of sociology at The University of Iowa. The 
order of authorship does not reflect a difference in con-
tributions to this study, which has truly been a joint 
endeavor. The authors would like to thank Stuart 
Freedman, Larry Haffner, Stuart Stover and l'am Kline 
for assistance in thedata collection or analysis, and Jae-
On-Kim, Stephen Mitchell, and especially Joseph 
Shcdd for helpful comments. 
foolhardy to adopt, a particular bargaining 
stance without a careful evaluation of the 
power and tactics available to oneself and to 
one's opponent. An analysis of this process, 
to have both theoretical and practical im-
port, must therefore specify the dimensions 
of employee and employer power, classify 
the relevant tactics, and relate the power 
dimensions to the evaluation and selection 
of tactics. This research develops such an 
analytical framework and tests some major 
implications of the framework under highly 
controlled conditions. 
The studies of Chamberlain and Kuhn, 
Stevens, and Walton and McKersie present 
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theoretically illuminating and empirically 
insightful analyses of bargaining tactics.1 
These authors fail to relate the tactical as-
pects of bargaining, however, to an explicit 
theory of bargaining power. The link be-
tween bargaining power and bargaining 
tactics is simply assumed and left undevel-
oped on a theoretical and empirical level. 
The failure to articulate the connection be-
tween power and tactics is partly due to the 
fact that students of collective bargaining 
adopt a nonanalytic approach to power. As 
noted by many writers, power has remained 
a blurred analytic construct in the collective 
bargaining literature.2 
We have argued that a theory of bargain-
ing tactics must be based on an explicit, 
multidimensional conceptualization of 
power and that the parties' selection of tac-
tics is ultimately based on their evaluation 
of the dimensions of power.3 The evaluative 
process that underlies tactical action in 
bargaining can be divided into three steps. 
First, bargainers evaluate their own power 
capability and that of their opponents. 
Second, given these perceptions of power, 
bargainers consider the likelihood that the 
power capability will actually be used. 
Third, in the context of their power situa-
tion, bargainers evaluate their own tactical 
options and attempt to anticipate their 
'Neil \V. Chamberlain and James \V. Kulin, Collec-
tive Bargaining (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), Carl 
M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Nego-
tiation (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), and Richard 
K. Walton and Robert B. McKcrsic, // Behavioral 
Theory oj Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1965). 
'See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, '"Bargain-
ing Power' in Price and Wage Determination," The 
Quarterly Journal oj Economics, Vol. 62 (May 1918), 
pp. 396-'117; Robert Dnbin, "Power and Union-
Management Relations," Administrative Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. I (June 1957), pp. 60-81; and 
Gerald G. Somers, "Bargaining Power and Industrial 
Relations Theory," in Gerald G. Somers, ed„ Essays 
in Industrial Relations Theory (Ames, Iowa: Iowa 
State University Press, 1969), pp. 39-53. 
'Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. I.awlcr, Power 
and Politics in Organizations: The Social Psychology 
of Conflict, Coalitions, and Bargaining (San Fran-
cisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1980), and Edward J. 
Lawlcr and Samuel B. Bacharach, "Power I)ej>endence 
in Individual Bargaining: The Expected Utility of 
Influence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
Vol. 32. No. 2 (January 1979), pp. 196-201. 
opponent's tactics. The first two issues were 
examined in prior research by the authors;4 
the third step is the key tactical dilemma 
confronting bargainers and the prime con-
cern of this paper. 
Power as Dependence 
We have argued that the notion of power 
embedded in power-dependence theory 
provides a flexible and insightful backdrop 
for both researchers and practitioners to deal 
with the power and tactical aspects of bar-
gaining.5 First of all, the theory offers a mul-
tidimensional conceptualization of power 
that identifies and differentiates the specific 
bases of employee-employer power; second, 
the theory provides a foundation for identi-
fying broad tactical options and for positing 
empirical links between bases of power and 
the tactics an actor may select in a bargain-
ing situation. Each of these advantages is 
developed in the following pages. 
Power-dependence theory stipulates that 
one party's power is a function of the other's 
dependence, which varies directly with the 
value the second party attributes to the out-
comes at stake (outcome value) and in-
versely with the availability of the same or 
better outcomes from alternative sources 
(outcome alternatives).6 Outcome value is 
viewed as the "importance of" or "need 
for" the outcomes in question, rather than 
outcome magnitude.7 Take an cmployee-
<Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J. l.awler, "The 
Perception of Power," Socio/ Forces, Vol. 55, No. 1 
(Spetcmber 1976), pp. 123— 31, and L.awler and Bacha-
rach, "Power DeiKiulencc in Individual Bargaining." 
'Bacharach and Lawlcr, Power and Politics in Or-
ganizations. 
•Richard M. Emerson, "Power-Dependence Rela-
tions," American Sociological Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 
(February 1962), pp. 31-'10; Richard M. Emerson, 
"Exchange Theory Part I: A Psychological Basis for 
Social Change," in Joseph Bcrger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., 
and Bo Anderson, eds., Sociological Theories in Prog-
ress, Vol. 2 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); and 
II. Andrew Michencr and Robert W. Suchner, "The 
Tactical Use of Social Power," in James T. Tedcschi, 
cd„ Social Influence Processes (Chicago: Aldine-
Atherton, 1972), pp. 239-86. 
'Bacharach and Lawlcr, Power and Politics in Or-
ganizations; Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in 
Social Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 196'1); 
Emerson, "Power-Dependence Relations"; Kenneth 
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employer conflict as an example. Power-
dependence theory suggests that the em-
ployee is dependent on the employer to the 
extent that the employee has poor alterna-
tives and values the outcomes at issue highly 
while the employer is dependent on the 
employee to the extent that the employer 
has poor alternatives and values the out-
comes highly. Overall, the employees' de-
pendence on employers is determined by 
their own situation (the employee's own 
alternatives and outcome value), and the 
employers' dependence is determined by 
their own situation (the employer's own 
alternatives and outcome value). 
The power-dependence perspective im-
plies a variable sum approach to power, in 
contrast to the conventional zero-sum ap-
proaches that prevail in the bargaining 
field. A zero-sum approach stipulates that 
an increase in one party's power, by defi-
nition, implies a decrease in the other's 
power; this assumes that there is a finite, 
unchanging level of "total" power in the 
relationship. Zero-sum conceptualizations 
focus on relative power and assume constant 
total power. This is an important distinc-
tion, because if we apply the zero-sum as-
sumption to the dependence relationship of 
parties, it leads us to conclude that any 
change in one party's dependence will have 
an equal and opposite effect on the other's 
dependence. On the other hand, a variable 
sum approach recognizes that total as well 
as relative power may vary and treats the 
relationship between the two parties' power 
(dependence) as an empirical question. 
Total power refers to the sum total of 
dependence in the relationship: the depend-
ence of A on B plus the dependence of B on 
A. Relative power is the ratio of one party's 
J. Gcrgcn, The Psychology of Behavior Exchange 
(Mcnlo Park, Cal.: Addison-Wcslcy, 1969); John W. 
Thibaut and Harold H. Kcllcy. The Social Psychology 
of Groups (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959). Out-
come alternatives represent a notion that is virtually 
identical to Thibaut and Kelley's "Comparison Level 
for Alternatives." It is the level or quality of alterna-
tives that is important, not the number. It takes only 
one good alternative to enhance the power of a party; 
the number of alternatives is only important insofar 
as it enhances the probability of getting better out-
comes elsewhere. 
dependence to the other's dependence: A's 
relative power refers to the ratio of B's de-
pendence on A to A's dependence on B, 
while B's relative power is the ratio of A's 
dependence on B to B's dependence on A. 
These ratios are the reciprocal of one an-
other and, therefore, relative power is in-
herently zero-sum. However, the fact that 
total power is analytically distinct from 
relative power means that there is no a priori 
connection or relationship between relative 
and total power. Total power can change 
with or without a change in relative power 
and vice versa. 
To exemplify the relationship between 
total and relative power, consider a situa-
tion in which the ratio of A's power to B's 
power is 2 to 1. Assume the "resources" that 
constitute power in the context can vary 
from 0 to 20 on some hypothetical contin-
uum and that the maximum total power in 
the relationship is 20. Given this total 
power, the same relative power (2 to 1 ratio 
in favor of A) could occur under different 
levels of total power: A = 4 vs. B = 2 or A = 10 
vs. B = 5, for example. Thus, the total power 
can change while the relative power remains 
the same. Next, let us see how changes in 
relative power can affect total power. Take 
the situation in which A controls 4 units of 
some power resource while B controls 2 
units. If A increases his resources from 4 to 6 
by developing access to more of the total 
power theoretically available in the rela-
tionship, then there would be a slight in-
crease in total power (from 6 to 8) and a shift 
in the relative power to a ratio of 3:1. How-
ever, a simultaneous or sequential accumu-
lation of resources by B could maintain the 
original 2 to 1 ratio and produce an even 
larger increase in total power. Finally, rela-
tive power can also shift while maintaining 
the same level of total power, as it would if A 
moves to 5 and B to 1. Overall, this conceptu-
alization leads to the conclusion thai the two 
parties can simultaneously increase in 
power just as they can simultaneously ex-
perience a reduction in power. An increase 
in one parly's power does not necessarily 
(and certainly not by definition) lead lo a re-
duction in the other's power. 
Applied to power-dependence theory, a 
variable sum approach suggests that the 
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interrelationships among the four dimen-
sions of dependence—employee's outcome 
alternatives, employee's outcome value, 
employer's outcome alternatives, employ-
er's outcome value—are important tactical 
questions confronted by actors in a bargain-
ing situation. On an "objective" level, there 
may be a zero-sum relationship among some 
aspects of the dimensions. For example, an 
increase in the wage rate may affect the em-
ployee's and employer's outcome value in 
an equal but opposite way; or a slack labor 
market may mean few alternatives for the 
employee and many for the employer. How-
ever, the relationships among these dimen-
sions of dependence are not necessarily that 
simple. While an increase in the wage rate 
may be highly important to the employee, 
it may be irrelevant to an employer who can 
easily pass on the cost of the wage increase to 
customers; similarly, a tight labor market 
for the employer might make alternative 
jobs available to the employee while ad-
vances in technology might minimize the 
employer's need for the employees; or a slack 
labor market for the employer could de-
crease the employee's alternatives while 
high training costs could counterbalance 
the effects of the slack labor market on the 
employer's alternatives. The point is that 
the "objective" relationships among these 
dimensions of dependence are very complex 
and that point, combined with the fact that 
parties typically have only imperfect infor-
mation on the pertinent social, economic, or 
political conditions, make the "subjective" 
or perceptual aspects of these relationships 
of prime concern to an analysis of tactics. 
Overall, the dimensions of dependence 
provide actors a shorthand way to sum-
marize and synthesize the power implica-
tions of the social, economic, and political 
conditions. In this sense, the dimensions of 
dependence are as much a perceptual phe-
nomenon as they are "objective" features of 
the bargaining context. The interrelation-
ship of the dimensions of dependence is 
primarily a matter of perception, especially 
as they relate to the tactical decisions in 
bargaining. It would not be appropriate 
to assume that parties will treat the dimen-
sions in a zero-sum manner even if that were 
the nature of the relationship on an "objec-
tive" level. It is just as reasonable, given our 
distinction between total and relative 
power, to assume that actors will treat the 
dimensions of their own dependence and of 
their opponents' dependence in a distinct 
and independent manner. We make neither 
assumption and suggest that this is an open 
question. 
Power and Tactical Action 
The tactical implications of the power-
dependence theory vary somewhat with how 
one interprets the connection between de-
pendence and power. The foregoing discus-
sion represents a strict interpretation of the 
theory. It indicates that the power of a party 
is determined, not by the party's own de-
pendence, but by his opponent's depend-
ence. Consistent with the variable sum 
elements of the theory, each party's power is 
independently determined by the other's de-
pendence on him, and a decrease in one 
party's dependence docs not automatically 
increase the other's dependence. Our inter-
pretation suggests a further distinction— 
between tactics that deal with one's own 
dependence and tactics that deal with the 
opponent's dependence, in other words, 
between the opponent's power over oneself 
and one's own power over the opponent. 
This distinction may be especially impor-
tant in the evaluation of tactics, and we will 
return to it later. 
This research will examine specifically 
the impact of the four dimensions of de-
pendence on parties' evaluation and pre-
diction of tactics. Two experiments are 
presented. The first experiment is concerned 
with three interrelated issues: (1) whether 
parties (employees and employers) use 
dimensions of their own or the other's de-
pendence to evaluate their own tactical 
options, (2) whether parties use these same 
dimensions of dependence to predict the 
other's tactics, and (3) whether the role (em-
ployee, employer, or observer) of the parties 
alters their use of the dimensions of depend-
ence to evaluate and predict the tactics of the 
employee and employer. 
A second experiment in this paper car-
ries the analysis of tactics one step further. 
The first experiment deals only with the 
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initial or first tactic. The second deals with 
the question of how dependence affects the 
prediction of tactics at the next stage in the 
conflict, after one of the parties has adopted 
a given tactic. Specifically, experiment 2 is 
concerned with: (1) what dimensions of 
dependence will parties use to predict the 
other's countertactical response and (2) will 
the dimensions of dependence affect the ex-
tent to which employees and employers 
anticipate tactic reciprocation, that is, apply 
a "tactic matching" principle. 
In an earlier study, we attempted to deal 
with the first issue specified above-wheth-
er parties use dimensions of their own or the 
other's dependence to evaluate their own 
tactical options.8 The primary import of 
that study was that it established the empiri-
cal relevance of the tactics incorporated in 
the present research. As in that study, this 
research is concerned with an employee-
employer situation in which the conflict 
is over a specific temporally bound issue 
(a pay raise). Within this context, the em-
ployee and employer have at least four op-
tions: (1) coalition (joint action with others 
in similar positions); (2) threat to leave the 
relationship (for employee, a threat to quit; 
for employer, a threat to replace the em-
ployee); (3) self-enhancement (persuading 
the other than one's inputs to the relation-
ship warrant the outcomes at stake); and (4) 
conflict avoidance (resigning oneself to do 
without the outcomes at stake).9 
In line with our approach to power-de-
pendence theory (discussed above), we will 
distinguish between those tactics that are 
based on a party's own dependence on the 
opponent (that relate to the other's power); 
and those tactics that are based on the op-
ponent's dependence on self (that relate to 
one's own power). We will refer to the first 
set as "direct" tactics and the second set as 
"indirect" tactics. "Direct" tactics are 
•Uwler and Bacharacli, "Outcome Alternatives 
and Value as Criteria for Multitactic Evaluations." 
'It is quite possible that changing lite unit of analy-
sis from individual to collective bargaining would 
alter the links between dependence and tactical options 
examined in this research. While we are convinced 
that the same framework applies to both individual 
and collective bargaining, we reserve for the future 
the question of how the two might be qualitatively 
different. 
grounded in a party's own dependence on 
the other. These tactics include a threat io 
leave the relationship and conflict avoid-
ance. A threat to leave uses the party's own 
alternatives and conflict avoidance uses the 
party's own outcome value. In contrast, 
"indirect" tactics manipulate the oppo-
nent's ability to use direct tactics by altering 
the opponent's dependence (hence, the 
label, "indirect"). A coalition can reduce or 
blunt the alternatives available to the oppo-
nent and thereby alter the opponent's ability 
to use a threat-to-leave tactic. Self-enhance-
ment, if successful, alters the value the other 
attributes to the outcomes at stake by em-
phasizing that one's own inputs to the rela-
tionship compensate for the other's loss of 
the outcomes at stake. In sum, two tactics use 
a party's own situation (threat to leave and 
conflict avoidance) and two tactics are di-
rected at the opponent's situation (coalition 
and self-enhancement). 
Hypotneses 
We expect different dimensions of de-
pendence to affect different tactics. This 
expectation is based on two assumptions. 
First, persons will use the level of alterna-
tives and the value of the outcomes at stake 
to identify points of strength or weakness in 
each other's situations. Second, different 
tactics can deal with different sources of 
strength or weakness. An actor with good 
alternatives, for example, should perceive a 
threat to leave as a more viable strategy, and 
lower levels of outcome value should make 
conflict avoidance more palatable. The 
basic implication of the foregoing assump-
tions is that different tactics deal with differ-
ent dimensions of dependence and, there-
fore, persons will use different dimensions 
of dependence to evaluate different tactics. 
Our expectation can thus be defined in 
four basic hypotheses. (In each one, the de-
pendent variable is a tactic available to an 
"actor," as distinguished from an "oppo-
nent"; the "actor" can refer to either the 
employee or employer.) (1) The better an 
actor's perceived alternatives, the greater the 
likelihood of a threat to leave by the actor; 
(2) The lower the value an actor ascribes to 
the outcomes at issue, the greater the likeli-
hood of conflict avoidance by the actor; (3) 
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The better the opponent's perceived alterna-
tives, the greater the likelihood of a coalition 
tactic by the actor— since a coalition can 
reduce the opponent's ability to use his 
alternatives; and (4) The lower the oppo-
nent's outcome value, the greater the likeli-
hood of self-enhancement by the actor— 
since a relatively soft strategy, such as self-
enhancement, becomes more effective if the 
other attaches low value to the outcomes. 
Each hypothesis indicates that one tactic 
should be especially sensitive to variation in 
one of the dependence dimensions. The 
hypotheses suggest where we should find 
the strongest links between the dimensions 
of dependence and the tactics, but they do 
not preclude the possibility of other unprc-
dicted effects. 
Experiment One 
Method 
Subjects and procedures. The data for 
this study were collected along with the data 
for an earlier paper.10 A role-playing simu-
lation manipulated the four dimensions of 
dependence in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design. 
A total of 528 undergraduates from two 
Northeastern universities were randomly 
assigned in equal numbers to one of the six-
teen experimental treatments. The role 
(employee, employer, observer) adopted by 
the subject was counterbalanced within 
each experimental condition to assure that 
the effects of dependence could not be at-
tributed to the particular standpoint (role) 
of the subject and to permit an analysis by 
role. 
Before responding to a questionnaire, 
subjects read a description of a situation in 
which the employer (manager-owner of a 
clothing store) was in the process of decid-
ing whether to increase the pay of some or all 
salespersons." The employer had told the 
10
.Sce I.awlcr and Buchurarh, "Outcome Alternatives 
and Value as Criteria for Multitactic Evaluations," 
for a more complete description of the methodology 
and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages 
of our role-playing method. 
"We did not s|>ecify how much of a pay increase the 
employee was asking for in the study. While this is not 
a trivial issue, we felt that it was better to leave this 
ambiguous. The reason is (hat our outcome value 
manipulation deals with the importance of the out-
employee that he is currently against giving 
pay raises but will make the final decision 
in about two weeks. In this context, the 
"description of the situation" stated: 
[The employee] is faced with deciding whether to 
try to influence [the employer] before he makes 
the final decision. [The employee] has the follow-
ing options: 1) as an individual, [the employee] 
could threaten to find another job; 2). . .try to 
persuade [the employer]... by pointing to his 
good sales performance; 3). . . join with other 
sales personnel and, as a group, attempt to 
pressure [the employer] into giving pay raises; or 
4). . .accept present pay and not try to influence 
[the employer]. Your task is to predict what op-
tions [the employee] will select. 
The description then indicated that the em-
ployer could respond to the action of the 
employee in a number of ways and listed the 
same set of options, adjusted, of course, for 
the employer role. 
The description also contained informa-
tion that manipulated the dimensions of 
dependence. The availability of alternative 
jobs for the employee and alternative sales 
workers for the employer manipulated the 
two outcome-alternative variables. Spe-
cifically, the manipulation of the employ-
ee's alternatives indicated that there was a 
10 percent or a 90 percent chance that [the 
employee] could find a better job, while the 
manipulation of the employer's alternatives 
indicated that there was a 10 percent or a 90 
percent chance that the employer could hire 
another person with the employee's qualifi-
cations. Outcome value was manipulated 
by varying the importance of getting a pay 
raise (for the employee) or avoiding a pay 
raise (for the employer). In brief, the ma-
nipulations stated the employee considered 
a pay raise as very important or not at all 
important (employee outcome value), and 
the employer considered it very important 
or not at all important to avoid pay raises 
(employer outcome value).12 Subjects were 
informed that both the employee and em-
ployer had this information on each 
comes at stake. If we had included some specific 
amount of pay, this could have weakened the outcome 
value manipulation and undermined our ability to test 
the effects of outcome value. 
"For the exact wording of the manipulations, see 
Lawlcr and Bacharach, "Power Dependence in Indi-
vidual Bargaining." 
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other's outcome alternatives and value, that 
is, both parties had information on all four 
dimensions of dependence.13 
Dependent variables. Separate question-
naire items for each of the four tactics asked 
subjects to (a) estimate how likely the em-
ployee would be to adopt the tactic, and (b) 
estimate how likely the employer would be 
to use each tactic in response to an influence 
attempt by the employee. Subjects re-
sponded on nine-point scales, labeled "not 
at all likely" at the low end and "highly 
likely" at the high end. 
The four questionnaire items, measuring 
subjects' evaluation of the employee tactics, 
took the following form. "How likely is it 
that the employee would (a) "threaten to 
leave the store and findanother job?" (threat 
toquit);(b) "try to persuade the employer. „ 
by pointing to his good sales performance?" 
(self-enhancement); (c) "organize with 
other sales personnel and, as a group, pres-
sure the employer to give pay raises?" (coali-
tion); (d) "decide to accept his current pay 
and not try to influence the employer?" 
(conflict avoidance). Items on the tactical re-
sponse of the employer asked subjects to esti-
mate the employer's response to an influ-
ence attempt, in general, without specifying 
the specific type of employee action (tactic) 
taken: "If the employee tries to influence 
the employer, how likely is it that the em-
ployer will . . . ." The same items were 
included, with appropriate adjustments 
for the employer position.1'1 
"It should be noted dial we are not assuming that 
bargainers in real world sellings have complete 
information but that such persons will make subjec-
tive judgments about all four dimensions of depend-
ence even in the face of inadequate and very sketchy 
information. To summarize, we believe that the in-
formation provided in the description is comparable 
to the overall subjective estimates that people might 
make in real sellings and that if we did not provide 
information on all four dimensions, it would actually 
be more unrealistic because parties do make these 
kinds of judgments. 
"Additional items asked them how confident they 
were in their estimates and how easy (or difficult) it 
was to understand the description of the situation. 
Subjects responded on nine-point scales, with higher 
mimlwrs indicating greater confidence or understand-
ing. On a nine-point scale, the mean confidence was 
6.1 and the mean level of understanding was 7.0, 
suggesting considerable confidence and under-
standing. 
Results 
There were two steps to the analysis. First, 
a multivariate analysis of variance (ANO-
VA) was used to determine whether dimen-
sions of dependence significantly affect 
multitactic predictions. Second, multiple 
regression was used to test the hypothesized 
effects of outcome alternatives and value on 
particular tactics. 
Multivariate ANOVA. Consider the mul-
tivariate ANOVA for the employee's tactics 
(Table 1) first. The multivariate analysis of 
variance revealed significant main effects 
for employee's alternatives (F = 56.67, p < 
.001, canonical R = .55) and employee's value 
(F= 18.92, p < .001,canonical R = .36). There 
was no main effect for employer's value 
(F < 1) or employer's alternatives (F = 3.17, 
p < .01,canonicalR = .16). Noneof the inter-
action effects between the dimensions of 
dependence were statistically significant; 
and a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 multivariate ANOVA 
with the subject-role (employee, employer, 
observer) as a factor revealed that the role 
occupied by the percciver did not interact 
with or specify the dependence effects. In 
sum, the multivariate ANOVA for the 
employee's tactics shows that individuals 
(regardless of role) use the employee's own 
dependence (employee's alternatives and 
value), and not the other's (employer's) de-
pendence, to predict the multitactic inclina-
tions of the employee. 
Next, consider the multivariate ANOVA 
for the employer's response to the employee 
(Table 2). This analysis showed a main ef-
fect for employer's alternatives (F = 12.93, 
p< .001, canonical R = .30) and employer's 
value (F = 8.78, p < .001, canonical R = .25), 
but no effects for the employee's alternatives 
(F < 1) or employee's value (F = 2.21, ns). 
None of the interactions were significant, 
and an analysis with role as a factor showed 
no interactions by role. These results are 
consistent with the findings for the employ-
ee's tactics. Just as persons use the employ-
ee's dependence to predict the employee's 
multitactic tendencies, they use the em-
ployer's dependence situation to predict the 
employer's response.15 
•Ml should be noted that the overall tactic rankings 
are consistent with an earlier study (Lawler and Bacha-
rach, "Outcome Alternatives and Value as Criteria 
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Table 1. Main Effects of Dependence Dimensions on the Subjective Likelihood of the 
Employee Adopting Each of the Four Tactics. 
\l)imensions of 
\l)ependence 
\ 
Employee \ 
Tactic \ 
Threat to 
quit 
Conflict 
avoidance 
Self 
enhancement 
Coalition 
A NOVA 
Employer's 
Alternatives 
Loiu 
3.98 
3.47 
6.56 
4.83 
its 
High 
3.CI 
3.86 
6.11 
4.73 
Employer's 
Value 
Low 
3.83 
3.53 
6.41 
4.83 
ns 
High 
3.77 
3.81 
6.21 
4.72 
Employee's 
Alternatives 
Low 
2.66 
3.98 
6.33 
4.63 
Y 
High 
4.91 
3.36 
6.34 
4.92 
. < .001 
ft 
Low 
3.48 
4.28 
5.89 
4.38 
1 
mployee's 
Value 
High 
4.11 
3.05 
6.77 
5.19 
) < .001 
Tabic 2, Main Effects of Dependence Dimensions on the Subjective Likelihood of the 
Employer Responding with Each of the Four Tactics. 
\l)imensions of 
\ Dependence 
\ 
\ 
Employer \ 
Tactic \ 
Threat to 
replace 
Conflict 
avoidance 
Self 
enhancement 
Coalition 
Multivariate 
ANOVA 
Empi layer's 
Alternatives 
Low 
3.66 
4.02 
6.13 
3.39 
P < 
High 
4.66 
3.63 
5.42 
3.28 
.001 
Employer's 
Low 
4.13 
4.22 
5.45 
3.25 
P 
Value 
High 
4.19 
3.12 
6.07 
3.42 
i < .001 
Employ 
Alternai 
Low 
4.08 
3.73 
5.81 
3.29 
ns 
<ee 's 
Uves 
High 
4.24 
3.91 
5.74 
3.37 
/•: 
Low 
4.06 
3.65 
5.67 
3.23 
mployee's 
Value 
High 
4.26 
3.99 
5.88 
3.41 
us 
for Multitactic Kvalualions"). .Self-enhancement is 
perceived as the most preferred tactic across experi-
mental conditions, followed by coalition, threat to 
leave, and conflict avoidance. The overall rankings are 
of minimal importance, however, because they are 
likely lo be a [unclion of such constant aspects of the 
social situation as the employee-employei relationship 
and conflict of interest. Moreover, the hypotheses 
predict changes in lactic predictions, not in the 
ranking of tactics. 
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Table 3. Regression of Dimensions of Dependence on Subjective Likelihood of Employee and 
Employer Tactics (Separate Equations for Each Tactic). 
(Unstandardized coefficients are in parentheses) 
\pimensions of 
\Dependencr 
Preaicted 
Variables 
(Tactics). 
\ 
Employee Tactics 
Threat to 
leave 
Conflict 
avoidance 
Self-
enhancement 
Coalition 
Employer Tactics 
Threat to 
leave 
Conflict 
avoidance 
Self-
enhancement 
Coalition 
Employi 
Allernalt 
- .08 ( 
.09 
- .10 ( 
-_;02 ( 
J5* 
- .10 
- .16* 
"r's 
ives 
- .37) 
(.39) 
- A'\) 
-.10) 
(.99) 
(-.39) 
(-.71) 
(-.11) 
Employi 
Value 
-.01 
.07 
- J i ( 
- .02 ( 
.02 
-2\* ( 
.1'!* 
.01 
?r's 
(.00) 
(.28) 
- .16) 
-.11) 
(.07) 
- .79) 
(.59) 
(.17) 
Employ 
Altermi 
.52* 
- .15* ( 
.00 
.06 
.01 
.05 
-.02 
.02 
re's 
ives 
(2.29) 
-.62) 
(.02) 
(.29) 
(.15) 
(.18) 
(-.07) 
(.09) 
Employee's 
Value 
M* 
-.30* (-
.21* 
.17* 
.05 
.09 
^05 
.05 
(.63) 
1.23) 
(.88) 
(.80) 
(.20) 
(.3-1) 
(.21) 
(.21) 
Equation 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
<1 
5 
6 
7 
8 
"Hypothesized relations are underlined. 
.001. 
Table 3 contains the standardized (and 
unstandardized) regression coefficients 
from separate equations for each tactic. 
Comparing coefficients for each tactic sepa-
rately (across each row of the table), we find 
that all hypotheses regarding power de-
pendence effects on direct tactics (threat to 
leave and conflict avoidance) were sup-
ported. As hypothesized, employee's alter-
natives had the largest effect (compared to 
the other independent variables) on an em-
ployee threat to leave (Equation 1); and 
employer's alternatives had the largest effect 
on the threat to leave response by the em-
ployer (Equation 5). Employee's value had 
the largest effect on conflict avoidance by 
the employee (Equation 2); and employer's 
value had the largest effect on the perceived 
likelihood that the employer would respond 
with conflict avoidance (Equation 6). 
The importance of these results is further 
documented by comparing the effects of 
each independent variable down the col-
umns of the table. Across the various equa-
tions (down each column), the employee's 
alternatives affected the employee's threat-
to-leave lactic more than any other tactic, 
and the employer's alternatives affected the 
employee's threat-to-leave tactic more than 
any other tactic. The same patterns exist 
for the links between each party's outcome 
value and conflict avoidance. Furthermore, 
the direction of all these effects (lower value, 
greater likelihood of conflict avoidance; 
higher alternatives, greater threat-to-leave 
likelihood) is in accord with the hypotheses. 
In sum, data on direct tactics consistently 
provide support for the hypotheses. 
In contrast, the data on indirect tactics 
(self-enhancement and coalitions) do not 
support the hypotheses (sec Equations 3, 4, 
7, and 8). The opponent's (employer or em-
ployee) alternatives were not used to predict 
an actor's inclination toward coalitions, and 
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the opponent's value was not used to make 
self-enhancement predictions. In fact, the 
opponent's dependence does not affect de-
cisions regarding any of the specific tactics. 
All significant effects on specific strategies 
(see upper right quadrant and lower left 
quadrant of Table 3) involve the actor's 
(whether employee or employer) own de-
pendence situation. 
Discussion 
The findings can be understood in the 
context of our interpretation of power-
dependence theory presented in the intro-
duction. Recall that the dependence of the 
employee on the employer (in other words, 
the employer's power) is determined by the 
employee's own alternatives and outcome 
value; whereas, the dependence of the em-
ployer on the employee (or the employee's 
power) is determined by the employer's 
own alternatives and outcome value. The 
most general implication of the first experi-
ment is that individuals will use the employ-
ee's own dependence (or employer's power) 
situation to evaluate and predict the em-
ployee's multitactic decisions, and the em-
ployer's own dependence situation (or em-
ployee's power) to evaluate and predict the 
employer's multitactic decisions. Given 
that the power is based on the other's de-
pendence, this means that individuals per-
ceive an actor's tactics (whether the em-
ployee or the employer) to be based primar-
ily on the opponent's power. 
Within the foregoing constraint posed by 
the dependence structure (and reflected in 
the multivariate ANOVAs), the results af-
firm the notion that different dimensions of 
dependence affect different tactics. A threat 
to leave is perceived as more likely when the 
actor (whether employee or employer) has 
high rather than low alternatives, and con-
flict avoidance is perceived as more likely 
when the actor attaches low rather than 
high value to the outcomes at issue. Tactics 
that are based on the actor's own dependence 
situation (direct tactics) are evaluated and 
predicted from different aspects of the act-
or's dependence (alternatives vs. value). In 
contrast, tactics that attack the opponent's 
dependence situation (indirect tactics) are 
not consistently predicted from any of the 
dimensions of dependence. The data reveal 
a few other relationships as well, but these 
are minor. It is noteworthy that the role 
standpoint (employee, employer, observer) 
does not qualify the results for dependence. 
It appears that individuals use the same 
criteria to predict olhers' tactics (whether 
from an opponent or observer standpoint.) 
as they do to develop their own action plans, 
to predict their own behavior. 
This first experiment examined how 
individuals in an employee-employer con-
text use dimensions of dependence to evalu-
ate and predict the tactics of the employee as 
well as the employer. The second experi-
ment focuses on the countertaclics of the 
employer (target of influence). Unlike the 
first experiment, the next one provides re-
spondents information on the particular 
tactic adopted by the employee (as well as 
the four dimensions of dependence) and 
considers the effect of the employee's spe-
cific tactic on the individual's use of depend-
ence to anticipate the employer's (target) 
response. 
Experiment Two 
The second experiment addresses two 
questions: First, will different employee 
tactics lead individuals to use different di-
mensions of dependence to predict the em-
ployer's multitactic response? Second, given 
that the employee has already adopted a 
specific tactic, does a "tactic-matching" 
principle enter into individuals' prediction 
of the employer's response? 
Regarding the first question, we offer the 
following corollary to the basic assump-
tions in the introduction: if the employee 
uses an indirect tactic (self-enhancement or 
coalition), individuals will use the depend-
ence dimension that the employee attacks 
to predict the employer's multitactic re-
sponse. The indirect tactics attack different 
aspects of employer's dependence: self-
enhancement is directed at the employer's 
value, while a coalition is directed at the 
employer's alternatives. Therefore, if the 
employee adopts self-enhancement, in-
dividuals will predict the employer's multi-
tactic response from the employer's own 
value; on the other hand, if the employee 
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selects a coalition tactic, the employer's 
alternatives will be used to predict the 
employer's response. In sum, although the 
first experiment failed to observe any effects 
of dependence on indirect tactics, the second 
experiment determines whether the em-
ployee's use of these indirect tactics affects 
the employer's response. No hypotheses for 
the direct tactics are offered because these 
tactics do not attack the employer's depend-
ence situation. 
The second goal of this experiment is to 
determine whether and how individuals use 
a "tactic-matching" principle. Experi-
mental research in a variety of contexts in-
dicates that actors often match their oppo-
nent's tactics. Threats often lead to counter-
threats, cooperation to cooperation, and 
concessions to concessions.16 Matching on 
a behavioral level is well documented, at 
least in bilateral-power contexts, but the 
present research is concerned with whether 
individuals cognitivcly use the "matching 
principle" to aid the subjective prediction 
of tactics. 
The tactic-matching principle is a rather 
strict variant of the reciprocity notion. The 
reciprocity principle suggests that people 
benefit those who benefit them and harm 
those who harm them. The matching prin-
ciple, more specifically, suggests a tit-for-
tat form of reciprocity whereby parties en-
gage in behavior that is as comparable as 
possible to the other parly's behavior. The 
comparability of the behaviors may vary 
across different social contexts, and the po-
tential for precise or exact matching re-
quires that both parties have similar be-
havioral repertoires. The present study 
provides actors (employees and employers) 
with the same options and thereby permits 
the strictest possible application of the 
matching principle. In this context, support 
for the matching principle is suggested to 
the extent that individuals expect the em-
"For example see: Chat Ian Nemeth, "A Critical An-
alysis of Research Utilizing the Prisoner's Dilemma 
Paradigm for (he Study of Bargaining," in Leonard 
llerkowitz, ed„ Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology (New York: Academic Press, 1972), Vol. 6, 
pp. 203- H and Bob Helm, Thomas V. Boiioma, and 
James T. Tedeschi, "Reciprocity for Harm Done," 
journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 87, First Half 
(June 1972), pp. 89-98. 
ployer to adopt the same behavioral option 
as the employee (such as a threat to replace 
by the employer in response to a threat to 
quit by the employee). 
An application of the power-dependence 
notion further suggests that the dimensions 
of dependence will modify expectations of 
tactic matching. Individuals should per-
ceive a greater tendency toward tactic 
matching when power-dependence condi-
tions are favorable to the particular tactic. 
Specifically, they should expect the em-
ployer to match (1) a threat to quit with a 
threat to replace especially when the em-
ployer has good alternatives, (2) conflict 
avoidance with conflict avoidance when the 
employer attaches low value to the out-
comes, (3) a coalition with a coalition when 
the employee has good alternatives, and (4) 
self-enhancement with self-enhancement 
when the employee attaches low value to the 
outcomes. In sum, the second experiment 
will determine whether individuals expect 
a matching response and whether the di-
mensions of dependence modify these ex-
pectations. 
Method 
The design and procedures were identical 
to the first experiment. The same number of 
subjects (528) were randomly assigned to 
conditions, but none of these subjects had 
participated in the first experiment. The 
questionnaire items (tactics) were identical 
except that the subjects estimated the likeli-
hood of the employer adopting the four op-
tions in response to each of the four em-
ployee tactics. That is, for each employee 
action, subjects estimated the likelihood of 
the employer responding with a threat to 
replace the employee, self-enhancement, 
coalition, and conflict avoidance (a total of 
16 items, 4 in response to each employee 
tactic). 
Results: Multivariate ANOVAs 
Multivariate analyses of variance were 
run to determine which dependence di-
mensions are used to evaluate and predict 
the employer's multitaclic response to each 
of the four employee tactics. 
Employer's response to indirect tactics. 
The results support both hypotheses. A 
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multivariate ANOVA on the employer's 
response to the employee's self-enhance-
ment tactic revealed a main effect for em-
ployer's value (F= 12.09, p < .001, canonical 
R = .30) and no effects for the other dimen-
sions of dependence. Data on the employer's 
response to a coalition revealed a main effect 
for the employer's alternatives (F = 6.24, 
p < .001, canonical R = .22) and no effects 
for the other dependence dimensions. Con-
sistent with the hypotheses, the dimension 
of dependence attacked by the employee's 
tactic was used to anticipate the employer's 
response. 
Employer's response to direct tactics. 
Although no explicit hypotheses were pre-
sented for direct tactics, the results indicate 
that individuals use different dimensions of 
dependence to predict the employer's re-
sponse to conflict avoidance and to a threat 
to leave. Subjects used only the employer's 
value in predicting the response to the em-
ployee's conflict avoidancc(F = 6.11, p < .001, 
canonical R = .21). In contrast, when the 
employer was confronted with a threat to 
leave by the employee, individuals used 
three dimensions of dependence to predict 
the employer's response: employer's alter-
natives (F = 25.27, p < .001, canonical R = 
.41), employer's value (F = 5.30, p < .001, 
canonical R = .20), and the employee's alter-
natives (F = 7.42, p < .001, canonical R = 
.23). Based on the canonical correlations, the 
employer's alternatives had the strongest 
effect. In sum, the employer's value is used to 
predict :he employer's multitactic response 
to conflict avoidance, and the employer's 
alternatives are given the greatest weight 
when individuals predict the employer's 
reaction to a threat to leave. 
Univariate effects. The links between 
specific dimensions of dependence and 
specific tactics replicate the effects of the 
first experiment. 
Results: Tactic-Matching 
The perceived likelihood of each em-
ployer response to each employee behavior 
is shown in Table 4. The tactic-matching 
means are on the diagonal. For a given tac-
tic, a consistent pattern toward matching is 
suggested if the matching mean (diagonal) 
is larger than any of the means down the 
column and across the row intersecting at 
the matching cell. Using a Mest for corre-
lated means (see Appendix) to compare the 
matching cell with each of the correspond-
ing column and row cells, we find that in-
dividuals expect the employer to match 
threat-to-leave and coalition responses, 
but not conflict-avoidance. The data for 
self-enhancement show only a weak tend-
ency toward matching. 
Although the perceived likelihood of 
matching varies for different responses, the 
tendency toward matching could be a func-
tion of the dimensions of dependence. To 
determine the effects of dependence, a 
matching score for each response was com-
Table </. Mean Subjective Likelihood of Each Employer Response 
by the Type of Employee Tactic." 
\Employees' 
\ 
Employer's 
Response 
Threat to 
leave (T) 
Coalition (('.) 
Self 
enhancement l 
Conflict 
avoidance (A) 
Tactic 
(S) 
Threat to 
Leave (T) 
5.91 
3.-10 
5.36 
3.91 
Coalition 
•1.63 
5.22 
5.05 
•1.52 
(O 
Self 
Enhancemei 
2.8-1 
2.93 
5.50 
5.31 
if (S) 
Conflict 
Avoidance (A) 
1.26 
1.70 
3.57 
3.59 
Sec Ap|K'iidix for correlated means. 
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puted." As in the first experiment, hypoth-
eses regarding direct tactics are confirmed 
and those concerned with indirect tactics 
are disaffirmed. Individuals perceive a 
greater tendency toward matching a threat-
to-leave tactic when the employer has many 
rather than few alternatives, and they see the 
employee as more inclined to match con-
flict-avoidance when the employer attaches 
low rather than high value to the outcomes 
at issue. These data suggest that the overall 
matching trend for threats to leave is ac-
centuated when the employer has many 
alternatives, while the negligible overall 
trend for matching conflict-avoidance in-
creases slightly under the circumstances of 
low employer value. 
Discussion 
The results indicate that the type of tactic 
used by the employee has a bearing on the 
anticipated tactical response of the em-
ployer. With regard to indirect tactics, in-
dividuals use the dependence dimension 
that the tactic attacks in order to anticipate 
the response of the employer. Specifically, 
individuals predict the employer's response 
to a self-enhancement tactic from the em-
ployer's outcome value, the dimension of 
dependence that the self-enhancement tactic 
attacks. They predict the employer response 
to a coalition solely on the basis of the em-
ployer's outcome alternatives, the dimen-
sion of dependence that coalition attacks. 
Thus, while the data from experiment one 
suggest that the selection of indirect tactics 
is not affected by the dependence dimen-
sions, data from experiment two lead us to 
qualify this conclusion. Dependence cri-
"The four means within each column of Table '1 
were used to consiruci matching scores for each tactic 
separately. The scores were constructed for each tactic 
by subtracting the average likelihood of nonmalching 
responses (within a column) from the mean likelihood 
of matching tactics (within that same column). lor 
example, if the employee adopts a ihreat-loquit 
tactic, a threat to replace by the employer is the match-
ing tactic. The tendency toward matching is measured 
by summing the mean likelihood of the nonmatchmg 
responses within (hat column, dividing by three, and 
then subtracting this value from the mean likelihood 
attached to the matching response. The same proced-
ure is used for each employer response, the only differ-
ence being that the matching and nonmatchmg re-
sponses change with the employee tactic. 
teria do affect the employer's selection of in-
direct tactics in response to the employee's 
use of indirect tactics. 
The direct tactics also have a bearing on 
the dependence criteria that underlie coun-
tertactic predictions. Specifically, individ-
uals use only the employer's outcome value 
to predict the employer's response to con-
flict avoidance; and the employer's alterna-
tives, primarily, to predict the employer's 
response to a threat to leave. The overall 
implication is that individuals will identify 
the dependence dimension underlying the 
employee's direct tactic and use that same 
aspect of the employer's situation to predict 
the employer's response. For example, a 
threat to quit by an employee is grounded in 
the employee's own alternatives, and in-
dividuals will use an analogous aspect of the 
employer's dependence situation (outcome 
alternatives) to predict the employer's re-
sponse. The reciprocal dependence dimen-
sion forms the foundation for predicting the 
employer's response to direct tactics. 
The "tactic-matching" hypotheses arc 
supported for the direct tactics but not for 
the indirect tactics. The employer is viewed 
as more likely to match a threat to leave 
when the employer has many rather than 
few alternatives and as more likely to opt for 
conflict avoidance in response to conflict 
avoidance when the employer's value is low 
rather than high. In contrast, individuals 
expect matching responses to coalitions 
regardless of the dependence conditions. 
The weak overall tendency toward match-
ing self-enhancement is also not modified 
by dependence conditions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Subjectively predicting tactics appears to 
be an integral element of most conflict situ-
ations. As in eveiyday life, parties in a con-
flict situation will adjust their actions not 
only to the situational or structural context 
but also to their expectations of how their 
opponent will respond to this context. In-
deed, this appears to be a critical determin-
ant of success in conflict settings just as it is 
a key to maintaining harmonious relations 
in everyday life. A recent book on intelli-
gence gathering in World War II, in fact, 
suggests that the success of the Allies was 
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not based simply on power or military force 
but also on their ability to predict the tac-
tical moves of Germany and adjust their 
own moves accordingly.18 It is clear that 
multiple tactic judgments and predictions 
are important. The present research ad-
dressed the issue of how people use infor-
mation on power dependence to formulate 
multitactic decisions and predictions. 
To summarize, the research has four im-
plications. First, the most general implica-
tion is that individuals use an actor's 
(whether employee or employer) own de-
pendence, but not the opponent's depend-
ence, to predict the actor's multitactic be-
havior. Both experiments consistently af-
firm this notion. Second, different aspects 
of the actor's dependence are used to predict 
different actor tactics. Both experiments 
indicate that individuals use an actor's out-
come alternatives to predict the likelihood 
of a threat to leave and the actor's outcome 
value to predict the likelihood of conflict 
avoidance. Third, the second experiment 
suggests, furthermore, that individuals use 
different aspects of dependence to predict 
the actor's response to different tactics used 
by the opponent. Specifically, they use an 
actor's alternatives to predict the actor's 
response to coalition and threat-to-leavc 
tactics by the opponent, and they use an 
actor's value to predict the actor's response 
to self-enhancement and conflict avoidance. 
The fourth implication of the research is 
that the dimensions of dependence affect 
differentially the perceived likelihood of 
tactic matching. Individuals view an actor 
as more likely to match a threat to leave if he 
has good rather than poor outcome alterna-
tives and conflict avoidance if he attaches 
low value to the outcomes at issue. 
This paper reinforces our belief that 
power-dependence theory provides an ap-
propriate framework for the understanding 
of the cognitive processes underlying bar-
gaining. Combining the findings of this 
paper with those in previous research shows 
that a dependence approach to bargaining 
power allows us to understand three critical 
"F. W. Wintcrbolhiim, The Ultra Secret (New York: 
Dell Publishing Co.. 1971). 
cognitive issues in the bargaining process: 
(1) how bargainers estimate each other's 
power capabilities;19 (2) how bargainers 
assess the likelihood that each other will use 
his power;20 and (3) how bargainers evaluate 
and select among available tactics and an-
ticipate the likely response to available 
tactics. 
These issues and their resolution should 
not be the exclusive domain of abstract 
theorizing; they must also be confronted on 
a day-to-day basis and applied to very spe-
cific contexts by practitioners. Our method-
ology has admittedly been artificial and 
removed from the "real world." However, 
as George Strauss points out, there are few 
experimentally derived hypotheses about 
bargaining that might not also be tested in 
ongoing labor-management relations.21 On 
the other hand, one of the primary problems 
of moving from laboratory experiments to 
field applications is the unit of analysis. 
This study, like most experimental analyses 
of bargaining, has focused on individual 
bargaining, and the relationships discov-
ered herein may differ when analyzed in 
the context of bargaining between collec-
tives. 
The prime importance of this paper is 
that it presents and empirically examines a 
new framework for linking the analysis of 
power and tactics in bargaining. The re-
search affirms the validity of the framework 
in a preliminary way, and this is the primary 
role of experimentation in the bargaining 
field. Field observation may modify our 
basic framework, suggesting new experi-
ments that may then suggest new ways to 
organize field observations. In this sense, 
the experiments in this paper represent not 
an end point but an important step in the 
dialectic between experimentation and field 
studies. 
"Bachanich and Lawler, "The Perception of 
Power." 
"Lawler and Bacharach, "Power Dependence in 
Individual Bargaining." 
2lGcorge Strauss, "Can Social Psychology Con-
tribute to Industrial Relations?" in Geoffrey M. 
Stcphanson and Christopher J. Brotherton, cds., 
Industrial Relations: A Social Psychological Ap-
proach (New York: Wiley, 1979), pp. 365-93. 
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Appendix 
T-Tcsts for Correlated Means 
Shown in Table 4." 
Comparison 
Threat to leave 
matching (IT) 
TT-CT 
TT-ST 
TT-AT 
TI'-TC 
TT-TS 
TT-TA 
Coalition 
matching (CC) 
CC-TC 
cc-sc 
CC-AC 
CC-CT 
cccs 
CC-CA 
Self-enhancement 
matching (SS) 
SS-CS 
SS-TS 
SS-AS 
SS-ST 
SS-SC 
SS-SA 
Conflict avoidance 
matching (AA) 
AA-CA 
AA-TA 
AA-SA 
AA-AC 
AA-AT 
AA-AS 
Mean 
Difference 
1.27 
3.07 
4.65 
2.51 
.54 
2.00 
1.82 
2.29 
3.52 
.59 
.17 
.70 
.51 
.20 
1.48 
2.73 
2.64 
.26 
- .93 
.32 
-1.72 
1.88 
2.34 
.02 
Matched 
t 
9.96* 
28.12* 
41.91* 
19.91* 
3.47* 
12.71* 
18.13* 
21.23* 
28.62* 
4.39* 
1.23 
4.64* 
4.99* 
2.00 
11.13* 
22.80* 
22.33* 
2.10 
7.33* 
2.89 
17.67* 
17.69* 
25.16* 
.11 
"The letters identify the tactics. The first letter refers 
to the employee's tactic (column) and the second letter 
identifies the employer's response (row). For example, 
TT-CT refers to the upper left cell (employee uses 
threat-to-lcave lactic and employer responds with a 
threat-to-leave lactic) minus the CT cell (employee 
coalition and a threat-to-lcave response by the 
employer). 
*p < .001. 
